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 FISCAL STRUCTURES AND REGIONAL
 ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM
 CHINA'S FISCAL CONTRACT SYSTEM
 Chien-Hsun Chen
 Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taiwan
 Hsiu-Ling Wu
 Tamkang University, Taiwan
 ABSTRACT
 This paper sets out to examine the impact of the fiscal contract system on economic growth in
 China's different provinces. Empirical testing is conducted using the error components model
 and pooled cross-section (provinces) and time-series data from 1989 to 1993. The empirical
 results for the whole sample show an inclination towards convergence of regional economic
 growth, with any increase in regional tax revenue hindering investment and employment due
 to excessive taxation, which is unfavorable to economic growth. The same finding applies to
 extra-budgetary revenue. Ranked by their overall strength, the provinces are divided into
 economically advanced and backward groups for empirical testing. Comparison of the
 empirical results using a sample of the top and bottom fifteen, in terms of their overall
 strength, reveals that the economic growth of the top fifteen provinces tends to be divergent.
 More fiscal revenue and extra-budgetary funds are unfavorable to economic growth and the
 results are the same for all provinces; the result also remains the same when fiscal revenue is
 itemized. The difference between the two lies in fiscal expenditure.
 JEL Classifications: E6, HI, H2, H5, P2
 Keywords: China s nscal Contract System, nscal structures, Oovernment Budget constraint,
 Regional Economic Growth
 Corresponding Author's Email Address: chchen(g>mail.cier.edu.tw
 INTRODUCTION
 The main characteristics of a classic centrally planned economy are public
 ownership of property rights and the control over both politics and the economy being
 exercised by one political party. Society can be likened to an enormous factory with the
 government at the head, whose overall functions encompass production, consumption,
 circulation and distribution activities. The government's functions therefore supersede
 those of the market mechanism, actively intervening in economic activities and
 amplifying the role that it plays. The objectives of China's fiscal policies reflect the
 expansion of the government's functions, with the principal objectives being mainly
 financing government expenditure, the distribution of government revenues, raising
 funds, the efficient allocation of resources and ensuring the steady growth of the
 economy.
 Prior to the institutional transformations which began in 1979, China had
 adopted a fiscal system based on 'unified revenue and expenditure' {tongshou
 tongzhi). People were forced to save through low wages, and most taxes and
 enterprise profits were submitted to the central government which then appropriated
 what it had received to provide for the fiscal needs of provinces, municipalities and
 autonomous regions based on economic arrangements. Under the unified revenue and
 expenditure fiscal system, government rationing replaced the market mechanism,
 with the fixed assets and working capital required by enterprises being funded gratis
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 by the government, which also took care of enterprises' losses and outstanding bank
 loans. Excessive human intervention, coupled with erroneous information, tended to
 aggravate the increasingly complex economic situation and was unfavorable to
 economic development, thereby leading to government failure. Such government
 failure included the uncorrected parts of market failure and inefficient resource
 allocation due to active government intervention (Krueger, 1990).
 Following the economic reforms, China's planned economy has been
 undergoing a gradual process of transformation into a market economy, with the
 system evolving from the unified revenue and expenditure system, to a 'fiscal
 contract system' {caizheng baoganzhi), and then to a 'tax assignment system'
 (fenshui zhf)} Under the fiscal contract system, competition was the driving force
 behind resource allocation amongst the different regions, with bureaucrats at all
 levels actively carrying out reforms that would facilitate local economic growth,
 since market reforms were considered to be the source of their own benefits.
 Ever since the economic reforms began, China has kept its economy growing at a
 rapid pace; thus the question of whether the changes to the fiscal system have impacted
 on regional economic growth during the overall process of institutional transformation
 seems worthy of exploration. The literature concerning empirical testing of fiscal
 expenditure and economic growth has focused on testing Wagner's Law, i.e.,
 government fiscal expenditure increases with the growth of an economy (Bird, 1971);
 this argument is, however, still inconclusive. The extant literature can be grouped into
 two groupings. One has used Granger causality test technique (e.g., Singh and Sahni,
 1984; Ram, 1986), the other has utilized co integration and error correction model (e.g.,
 Islam, 2001; Chang, 2002). Nevertheless, the different econometric techniques
 sometimes yield different empirical results. The study by Singh and Sahni (1984)
 focusing on India over the period 1950-1981, demonstrated that there was a two-way
 relationship between fiscal expenditure and national income, whilst in an empirical
 study conducted by Ram (1986), using data obtained from 63 countries between 1950
 and 1980, the findings showed that only around a third of the countries passed
 Wagner's hypothesis.
 Despite the recent development and application of the cointegration approach,
 there is continuing variance as to whether Wagner's hypothesis holds from country to
 country. Henrekson (1993) demonstrated the lack of a cointegration relationship
 between government expenditure and economic growth using data on Sweden
 covering the period from 1961 to 1990. Murthy (1993, 1994) used data on Mexico
 covering the periods 1950-1980 and 1950-1988 to test Wagner's hypothesis, with the
 results supporting Wagner's Law; however, when exercising the cointegration
 approach and using the same data, Ashworth (1994) obtained contrary results. Using
 data on Greece from 1951 to 1992, Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1995) discovered
 that it did not support Wagner's Law.
 Empirical analyses supporting Wagner's Law include Abizadeh and Gray
 (1985), and Bohl (1996). Using data from the developed countries in the post World
 War Two era, these studies showed that the data on Canada and England supported
 Wagner's Law. Payne and Ewing (1996) examined 22 countries, amongst which, the
 data on Australia, Columbia, Germany, Malaysia, Pakistan and the Philippines all
 supported Wagner's Law. Kolluri and Panik (2002) examined data on the G7
 countries between 1960 and 1993, with the results also supporting Wagner's Law.
 Islam (2001) used data on the US between 1929 and 1996 and showed that a long-run
 equilibrium relationship existed between per capita real income and the relative size
 of government, thus supporting Wagner's hypothesis. Chang (2002) examined three
 rapidly developing newly industrialized economies - South Korea, Taiwan and
 Thailand - along with three industrialized countries - Japan, the US and the UK -
 from 1951 to 1996. In their study, a long-run equilibrium relationship between
 national income and government expenditure could be identified in every case except
 Thailand.
 The literature touching upon the impact of fiscal expenditure or tax revenue on
 economic growth includes Barth, et al. (1990), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and
 Fischer (1993). However, the empirical evidence showed no consensus amongst them
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 (Martinez- Vazquez and McNab, 2003). The literature with regard to the impact on
 economic growth stemming from the change to the fiscal system, as China
 transformed itself from a planned economy towards a market economy, includes
 Zhang and Zou (1998), which used data from China's 28 provinces between 1986
 and 1992 and found that fiscal decentralization had a negative impact on economic
 growth; however, Lin and Liu (2000) had contrary findings, concluding that fiscal
 decentralization had a positive impact on economic growth in China. Chen (2004)
 indicated that an increase in China's fiscal decentralization leads to a higher level of
 provincial expenditure. As can be seen from the brief review of the empirical
 findings, the lack of consensus could stem from differences in econometric methods
 employed by the researchers; for example, Zhang and Zou (1998) utilized random
 effect estimation with the generalized least squares (GLS) regression. Lin and Liu
 (2000) used the fixed effect model. A random effect model was also employed by
 Chen (2004).
 The empirical literature referred to above use advanced or developing
 countries as the research subjects; however, no research on the same issue
 was ever conducted on economies going through an institutional
 transformation. The aforementioned literature exploring the impact of
 China's fiscal system did not examine the impact of the fiscal structure has
 on regional economic growth, particularly at provincial level. Since provinces
 tried hard to balance their budgets under the fiscal contract system, when establishing
 empirical models, it is necessary to take into account the uniqueness of China's fiscal
 system without ignoring government budget constraint, as suggested by Christ (1968,
 1979). Miller and Russek (1997a, b) recently examined the impact of fiscal structure
 on economic growth taking budget constraint into consideration, and found that when
 developing countries financed government expenditure with bonds, this had a
 negative impact on economic growth.
 In addition to the government budget constraint that is inherent in China's fiscal
 system, under the fiscal contract system different provinces had different tax
 incentives and fiscal expenditure structures which influenced both the capital
 accumulation in the provinces as well as labor movement between them. This in turn
 influenced their economic growth. Therefore, empirical models also have to take into
 account the conditional convergence hypothesis (Miller and Russek, 1997a, b). With
 regard to the ways that the differences in tax incentives and fiscal expenditure
 structures amongst provinces impact on provincial economic growth, the empirical
 models of Helms (1985) and Mofidi and Stone (1990) considered the impact that
 taxes have on labor supply and cost function, and suggested that high taxes impede
 the establishment of new businesses and the expansion of existing ones, which in turn
 demotivates work and investment, and is harmful to economic growth. On the other
 hand, if fiscal expenditure helps to attract businesses, encourage labor movement and
 capital accumulation, then it will also help to promote economic growth.
 The main purpose of this paper is therefore to examine the impact that the
 evolution of China's fiscal contract system has had on regional economic growth
 using pooled cross-section and time-series data to observe the period between 1989
 and 1993. China's huge size means that economic development and fiscal scale vary
 enormously between the different provinces/regions; therefore, these provinces
 (including municipalities and autonomous regions) are sorted according to their
 overall strength, and then divided into two groups for comparison.
 The remainder of this paper is composed as follows. The next section describes
 the evolution of the fiscal contract system and its impact on the behavior of local
 governments. This is followed by the establishment of the empirical model based on
 the characteristics of the fiscal contract system, and thereafter, by the analysis of the
 empirical results. The paper closes by outlining the conclusions drawn from this
 study.
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 THE EVOLUTION OF THE FISCAL CONTRACT SYSTEM
 The fiscal contract system was established in 1980 and abolished in 1993, with
 its implementation between 1980 and 1984 demarcating the scope of local fiscal
 revenue and expenditure, and determining the contractual basis for both. Local
 governments were responsible for balancing their own budgets; thus, the more
 revenue they collected the more they could spend, and vice versa. Regional fiscal
 revenues include fixed fiscal revenue, fixed-percentage shared revenue and
 adjustment revenue. Fixed fiscal revenues include operating income from
 regionally-owned enterprises, salt tax, husbandry taxes, industrial and commercial
 tax, local taxes and other local income. Fixed-percentage shared revenues are
 revenues that are shared by local and central governments, with the former taking 20
 per cent and the latter, 80 per cent. Adjustment revenues are calculated by
 multiplying product tax, appreciation tax and value-added tax (VAT) by a
 predetermined weight.
 Regional fiscal expenditure includes regionally financed investments in basic
 infrastructure; working capital for regionally-owned enterprises; expenditure in
 support of agricultural production; operating expenses for agriculture, forestry, water
 conservancy, meteorology, industry, communication, business, culture and education,
 sanitation and science; city upkeep outlays; social benefit payments; administrative
 expenses; and so on. Judging from the projected fiscal revenue and expenditure for
 1979, if regional fiscal expenditure was greater than combined fixed fiscal revenue
 and shared revenue, but less than aggregate regional fiscal revenue, both fixed fiscal
 revenue and shared revenue remained within the region. If regional fiscal expenditure
 was greater than regional fiscal revenue, then the central government would subsidize
 a certain amount.2
 A refined fiscal contract system was adopted between 1985 and 1987. Under
 this new system, government fiscal revenue fell into three categories, central
 government fixed fiscal revenue, regional government fixed fiscal revenue and their
 shared revenue. An expenditure base was estimated according to the region's
 financial resources. After taking into account fixed and shared revenue for the region,
 percentage shares were then determined. In 1985, the respective percentage shares
 for Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hebei, Shanxi and Liaoning were 49.55 per cent,
 39.45 per cent, 23.54 per cent, 69.10 per cent, 97.50 per cent and 51.08 per cent.
 Four different fiscal contract system programs were adopted in different regions
 in 1985: (i) 'total amount sharing' was implemented in fifteen provinces including
 Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu,
 Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, Henan, Hunan, Hubei and Sichuan;3 (ii) a 'fixed amount
 subsidy' was adopted in Shaanxi, Gansu, Jilin and Jiangxi provinces; (iii) an 'ethnic
 fiscal system with fixed amount subsidy' was adopted in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang,
 Tibet, Guangxi, Ningxia, Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai; and (iv) a 'major fiscal
 contract system' was implemented in Guangdong and Fujian.
 Due to its failure to motivate the regions to submit more to the central
 government, total amount sharing was modified in 1988 by categorizing several other
 types of taxes as regional fixed revenue those that were small in amount and the
 sources of which were widely scattered, and then implementing various forms of the
 fiscal contract system to ensure the growth of both submitted and regionally retained
 revenues. The details were as follows:
 (i). Beijing, Hebei, Liaoning, Shenyang, Haerbin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Ningbo,
 Henan and Chongqing adopted an 'incremental revenue contract'.
 (ii). Tianjin, Shanxi and Anhui adopted 'total amount sharing'.
 (iii). Dalian, Qingdao and Wuhan adopted 'total amount sharing plus
 incremental sharing'.
 (iv). Hunan and Guangdong adopted an 'incremental submitted amount
 contract'.
 (v). Shanghai, Shandong and Heilongjiang adopted 'submitting a fixed amount'.
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 (vi). Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Guizhou, Yunnan,
 Qinghai, Jilin, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Fujian, Hainan, Hubei and
 Sichuan adopted a 'fixed amount subsidy'.
 The fiscal contract system implemented between 1980 and 1993 broke away
 from the traditional unified revenue and expenditure framework, granting regional
 governments more financial resources to promote the growth of the regional
 economy with regional governments being requested to balance their own budgets. It
 was impossible to finance regional expenditure through the issuing of bank notes or
 government bonds; thus, the main sources of fiscal revenue came from taxes levied
 on manufacturing and business activities. Only through taxation could regional fiscal
 expenditure be financed. In other words, regional governments did their best to
 increase tax revenues (Jin, et al., 2005). Once regional revenue increased, financing
 could be provided for regional fiscal expenditure to promote the development of the
 regional economy.
 Under the fiscal contract system, competition was the driving force in resource
 allocation between regions; however, regional governments encountered a number of
 difficulties in the process of maximizing their tax revenue. First of all, industrial
 policies did not achieve the goal of bringing about the comparative advantage of
 different regions. Instead, regions competed in developing industries which had a
 high tax rate applied to them and had low investment requirements. This resulted in a
 concentration on similar industries for regional economies (Han and Zhang, 1995).
 Secondly, the fiscal contract system was a joint effort on the part of the central and
 regional governments intended to reduce the tax burden of citizens; however, the
 system also led to a sharp fall in the government's tax revenue (Jiang, 1996). Thirdly,
 the complexity of the system was the result of a bargaining process between central
 and regional governments. There was therefore a high level of instability in the
 distribution of financial resources between the two (Ma, et al., 1997).
 1994 saw a turning point in China's fiscal system reform. Borrowing from
 fiscal federalism, the regional fiscal contract system was replaced by a 'tax
 assignment system', the purposes of which were to stabilize the central government's
 budgetary revenue and raise the proportion of its fiscal revenue, to redefine revenue
 distribution between central and regional governments, and to dispose of the
 phenomena of duplicated construction in different regions. Under the new system,
 the share of GNP accounted for by fiscal revenue rose from 14.5 per cent in 1991, to
 25 per cent in 2000, whilst the share of gross fiscal revenue allocated as central
 government revenue also rose to 60 per cent in 2000.
 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
 In order to examine the impact of China's fiscal contract system on regional
 economic growth, the proposition for establishing the model is the conditional
 convergence hypothesis suggested by Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992),
 Mankew, et al. (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1996). Additional fiscal structure variables are
 incorporated into the model as control variables to determine the effects of fiscal structure
 on regional economic growth. Since institutional transformation began, under the fiscal
 contract system, different provinces had different tax incentives and fiscal expenditure
 structures, thus influencing their capital accumulation and labor movement, which in turn
 influenced their economic growth (Miller and Russek, 1997a, b; Kneller et al., 1999; Lee
 and Gordon, 2005).
 China's regional economic growth rate is determined as follows:
 pglt = \npyit-\npyi(_] (1)
 where pg = the real growth rate of provincial per capita income;
 py - provincial real per capita income; / = 1,2,3,... . represents provincial
 cross-section data; and t = 1,2,3,.... represents provincial time-series data.
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 Assuming Xit = (XinXinXin
 fixed asset investment, fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure modes; these variables
 will influence provincial capital accumulation and labor movement, which in turn
 will influence economic growth. Therefore, the regional growth pattern is determined
 as follows:
 n
 pgit=a + ^ßkXku+eu
 -i (2)
 sit =fiii+ot+cou (3)
 where Mi ~ ^(0, & ß ) is cross-section disturbance; v ^ N ( 0 , cr J )
 is time-series disturbance; and O)it ~iV(0, <TÖ ) is pooling disturbance.
 Assuming that these disturbances are not correlated and that there is no
 autocorrelation, the following conditions are satisfied:
 Cov(//"ü')=Cov(>""ö>") = Cov (ü,^i,)=o
 Cov^'^0 i*J
 Cov(^)=o t*t
 Cov^'"^>=0 t*t
 Co\(o)u,u).)=0 **J t*t
 The following is obtained by substituting (3) into (2):
 n
 Pgi = <* + £ A** + Mi + »t + ®// (4>
 )t=i
 The residual consists of three types of variance: Var (^7 ) = & ^ + ^ + O^
 Given that one of the characteristics of China's planned economy since the start
 of the reforms has been considerable extra-budgetary revenue (Eckaus, 2003), this
 revenue is thus taken into account in the empirical testing. Consideration is also
 given to government budget constraint with regard to financing provincial
 expenditure with taxes (Christ, 1968, 1979). The model is then as follows:
 Pg.t =aQ+a, \npy¡ms +a2FAIlt +a3TRl( +aJEit
 + a5EBRlt+a6SURlt+£tl (5)
 The provincial retail price index (1981 = 100) is used as the price deflator when
 calculating the real term of provincial real per capita income. #^1988 stands for
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 provincial initial condition, denominated by real per capita income in 1988; FAI
 stands for the ratio of provincial fixed assets investment to provincial national
 income; 77? represents the ratio of provincial total fiscal revenue to provincial
 national income; TE stands for the ratio of provincial total fiscal expenditure to
 provincial national income; EBR represents the ratio of provincial extra-budgetary
 revenue to provincial national income; and SUR stands for the ratio of provincial
 fiscal surplus to provincial national income.
 The provincial total fiscal revenue and expenditure shown in Equation (5) can
 be further subdivided by its structure with the regression model as follows:4
 pgit =bo+bx In pyims + b2FAIu + b3RAit + b4RBit + b5EAl( + b6EBlt
 + b1EBRlt+b,SURit+elt (6)
 RA stands for the ratio of provincial Category 1 fiscal revenue to provincial
 national income. Category 1 fiscal revenue includes product tax, value-added tax,
 business tax, agricultural tax, farmland occupation tax, energy and transportation
 fund tax and revenue raised from the budget adjustment fund. RB stands for the
 ratio of provincial Category 2 fiscal revenue to provincial national income. Category
 2 revenue covers state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) income tax, SOEs' adjustment tax,
 SOEs' profit remittance and subsidies for planned losses. EA stands for the ratio
 of provincial Category 1 fiscal expenditure to provincial national income. Category 1
 fiscal expenditure comprises of capital construction, innovation enterprises, science
 and technology promotion, support for agricultural production, the operating
 expenses of industry departments, commerce and transportation, operating expenses
 for agriculture, forestry, water conservancy, meteorology, culture, education, health,
 science, welfare assistance, administrative overheads, the public security agency, the
 procurator agency and the court of justice. EB stands for the ratio of provincial
 Category 2 fiscal expenditure to provincial national income. Category 2 fiscal
 expenditure entails price subsidies.
 If the initial condition coefficients a¡ and bj of Equations (5) and (6) turn out
 negative, the conditional convergence hypothesis is borne out, otherwise it is not.
 The implication of the conditional convergence hypothesis is that those provinces
 with a low level of initial real per capita income are expected to grow at a faster pace
 than those with higher levels, whilst fixed asset investment is expected to have a
 positive impact on economic growth.
 In addition to testing the validity of the conditional convergence hypothesis, in
 the empirical analysis, we also consider what implications the fiscal structure
 variables have in Equations (5) and (6). With respect to Equation (5), due to
 government budget constraint, only two of the three coefficients of revenue,
 expenditure and surplus need to be estimated; therefore, the surplus variable is ruled
 out. That means that if expenditure remains unchanged, the coefficient a3 can be used
 to measure the impact which increased revenue has on economic growth. In other
 words, high taxes will make people less willing to work and invest, which is
 unfavorable to economic growth. By the same token, if revenue remains unchanged,
 the coefficient a4 can be used to measure the impact that increased expenditure has
 on economic growth; however, if revenue remains unchanged, government bonds
 will have to be issued to finance expenditure. In China, bonds are issued by central
 government, not regional government, and under the fiscal contract system, when
 regional government was poorly financed, central government would provide
 subsidies. Therefore, the budget deficit was made up by a central subsidy rather than
 by the use of bonds.
 Equation (6) is similar to Equation (5), in that it also tests the validity of the
 conditional convergence hypothesis. Equation (6) also subdivides expenditure and
 revenue into several categories. Interpretation of the estimated coefficient is the same
 as that in Equation (5), with the aim being to assess the impact on the regional
 economic growth of the various items of revenue and expenditure.
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 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
 Pooled cross-section and time-series data were employed to examine the impact that
 China's adoption of the fiscal contract system had on regional economic growth.
 Although the system was introduced in 1980, because of the lack of data, our study
 covers only the period between 1989 and 1993, there are 150 observations in the data
 set. Given its huge size, China's geography varies from one province to another, as
 do their natural resources, human resources, capital stock, technology, production
 capacity and economic efficiency. This has led to significant differences in the level
 of economic development achieved in the different provinces. Ranked by their
 overall strength indicators, the provinces are divided into economically advanced and
 backward groups to facilitate testing and comparison. Overall strength represents
 development potential based upon economic, technological, social and natural
 resource indicators. Economic strength indicators include the level of economic
 development, production capacity, capital supply capabilities, key production
 elements supply capabilities and economic efficiency. In terms of overall strength,
 the top fifteen provinces were Liaoning, Guangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong,
 Beijing, Sichuan, Hubei, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Hebei, Henan, Tianjin, Hunan and
 Shaanxi, with the bottom fifteen being Anhui, Jilin, Fujian, Shanxi, Yunnan, Inner
 Mongolia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Ningxia, Hainan
 and Tibet.
 Empirical data were extracted from various issues of Statistical Yearbook of China
 1990-1994, Finance Yearbook of China 1993-1994, and China Finance Statistics
 1950-1991. Due to the use of pooled data, the fixed effects model can only analyze the
 effects of observed samples within certain confines. China's huge size and the
 idiosyncrasies of its constituents make it difficult to quantify the data collected when
 measuring the geographical, social, institutional and economic ingredients of the
 provinces. Moreover, the use of dummy variables will lessen the degree of freedom and
 affect the efficiency of the estimation. In addition, the results of the dummy variables are
 difficult to interpret.
 Mundlak (1975) noted that individual effects could be considered random, and for
 this reason, empirical testing adopted the error components model or random effects
 model. The Da Silva error components test technique assuming individual effects as
 random is therefore used to estimate the model. The Da Silva method estimates the
 regression parameters using a two-step generalized least squares (GLS)-type estimator
 (Drummand and Gallant, 1992). An alternative procedure is to estimate the fixed effects
 model, but the results of the fixed effects model do suffer the problem of
 heteroscedasticity. Sensitivity tests are further used to develop a more robust set of
 empirical results (Levine and Renelt, 1992). According to these sensitivity tests, if the
 coefficients are not sensitive to the inclusion of different variables, e.g., the coefficients
 do not change signs or become insignificant, the variables can robustly affect the
 dependent variable.
 Only the results of the error components model are presented, with the
 empirical model consolidating cross-section and time-series data. The residual may
 thus include disturbances from cross-section data, or time-series data, or both.
 Consequently, the null hypothesis of the model specification is valid can be tested by
 deciding if homoskedasticity exists using Breusch and Pagan's (1980) Lagrange
 multiplier (LM) statistics test. In addition, correlation coefficients are used to
 determine whether multi-collinearity exists amongst the independent variables.
 The empirical results using all provinces as the sample are shown in Tables 1 to
 4. The respective LM statistics of Tables 1 and 3 are 0.885 and 0.06; both are smaller
 than the critical value of chi-square distribution, at 6.63, with a significance level of 1
 per cent and a degree of freedom of 1 . The model thus possesses homoskedasticity
 with no specification error. In addition, the correlation coefficients of the
 independent variables, listed in Table 2, are between -0.25 and 0.1830, whilst those
 listed in Table 4 are between -0.3217 and 0.5963. Therefore, multi-collinearity does
 not exist between the two sets of independent variables.
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 TABLE 1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS (ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL)
 FOREQUATION (5) FOR ALL SAMPLES
 Independent Variable
 lnpy -0.1654 (0.0436)**
 FAI 0.5024 (0.0051)**
 TR -0.8846 (0.0049)**
 TE -0.5248 (0.0154)**
 EBR -1.1914 (0.0174)**
 Root MSE 24.3855
 Breusch-Pagan Test Lagrange Multiplier
 ^ . . U.ooj
 Statistic ^ . .
 Notes: ** Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; values in parentheses are standard
 deviations.
 TABLE 2 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDEPENDENT
 VARIABLES FOR EQUATION (5) FOR ALL SAMPLES
 py FAI TR TE EBR
 Py 1.000 -0.0104 0.0236 0.0302 -0.0155
 FAI - 1.0000 -0.0787 -0.1186 -0.1202
 TR - - 1.0000 0.1830 -0.0136
 TE 1.0000 -0.2500
 TBR ... - 1.0000
 As shown in Table 1 , the estimated coefficient of initial condition (In py) is
 negative with a 1 per cent significance level, suggesting verification of the
 conditional convergence hypothesis; that is, the differences in economic growth are
 moving towards convergence for every province. The poor provinces are trying to
 catch up with their richer counterparts through growth at a much more rapid pace.
 The estimated coefficient of FAI is positive with a significance level of 1 per cent;
 t at is, an increase in fixed assets is favorable to regional economic growth. The
 estimated coefficient of TR is negative with a significance level of 1 per cent. Under
 the fiscal contract system, provinces tried hard to balance their budgets and were
 allowed to seek new financial resources to increase their tax revenues. If expenditure
 remained unchanged, provinces could submit more to the central government and
 keep more for themselves when revenue increased; owever, excessive taxation
 hinders employment and investment, a d is unfavorable to economic growth. The
 estimated coefficient of TE is negative with a significance level of 1 per cent. Since
 provincial governments did not have the authority to issue bonds, they had to rely on
 central subsidies if revenue remained unchanged while expenditure increased. And
 since they did not have to pay back the subsidy, moral hazard was likely. Inefficient
 fund utilization was thus inimical to economic growth.
 The estimated coefficient of EBR is negative with a significance level of 1 per
 cent. Extra-budgetary revenue was at the disposal of the local government and new
 fi ancial resources had to be found in order to increase extra-budgetary revenue,
 which discouraged work and investment and had a negative impact on eco omic
 growth.
 If we subdivide the fiscal structure of provinces, the empirical results are as
 shown in Table 3. After subdividing expenditure and revenue into several categories,
 the impact on the regional economic growth of the various items of revenue and
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 TABLE 3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS (ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL)
 OF EQUATION (6) FOR ALL SAMPLES
 Independent Variable
 lnpy 0.0184 (0.0444)
 FAI 0.3856 (0.0796)**
 RA 0.4041 (0.4293)
 RB 0.1087 (0.5902)
 EA -0.2567 (0.2269)
 EB -1.0992 (1.0290)
 EBR -0.8207 (0.3357)*
 RootMSE 1.8231
 Breusch-Pagan Test Lagrange Multiplier
 u.uo
 Statistic
 Notes: **Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; *indicates significance at the 5 per cent
 level; values in parentheses are standard deviations.
 TABLE 4 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDEPENDENT
 VARIABLES FOR EQUATION (6) FOR ALL SAMPLES
 py FAI RA RB EA EB EBR
 py 1.0000 -0.1724 0.2636 0.0671 -0.3217 -0.0581 0.0114
 FAI - 1.0000 0.0409 -0.1049 0.1914 0.1510 0.1678
 RA - - 1.0000 0.3137 0.0787 0.1187 0.5963
 RB - - - 1.0000 0.1204 0.1607 0.1134
 EA - - - - 1.0000 -0.1807 0.1376
 EB ----- 1.0000 0.3283
 EBR ....-- 1.0000
 expenditure become insignificant. Only the estimated coefficients of FAI and EBR
 are significant at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent level, respectively, whilst the impact of
 initial condition and fiscal structure variables on economic growth are mitigated to be
 insignificant.
 TABLE 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS (ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL)
 FOR EQUATION (5) FOR THE TOP FIFTEEN PROVINCES OF
 THE SAMPLE
 Independent Variable
 lnpy 0.0351 (0.0051)**
 FAI 0.7355 (0.0148)**
 TR -1.1863 (0.0088)**
 TE 3.3479 (0.0723)**
 EBR -3.3787 (0.0357)**
 RootMSE 12.5352
 Breusch-Pagan Test Lagrange Multiplier
 Statistic
 Notes: ** Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; values in parentheses are standard
 deviations.
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 Tables 5 through 8 list the empirical results for the sample of the top fifteen
 provinces ranked by their overall strength. In Tables 5 and 6, the respective Breusch
 and Pagan LMs are 3.975 and 0.0075; both are smaller than the chi-square
 distribution critical value of 6.63 with a significance level of 1 per cent and degree of
 freedom of 1. The model thus possesses homoskedasticity with no specification error.
 The correlation coefficients in Table 6 are between -0.6576 and 0.2934, whilst those
 in Table 8 are between -0.7544 and 0.6347; therefore, multi-collinearity does not
 exist between the two sets of independent variables. The empirical results in Table 5
 show that the estimated coefficient of the initial condition (\npy) was positive.
 TABLE 6 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDEPENDENT
 VARIABLES FOR EQUATION (5) FOR THE TOP FIFTEEN PROVINCES
 OF THE SAMPLE
 py FAI TR TE EBR
 py 1.000 -0.0468 -0.0458 0.1038 -0.1286
 FAI - 1.0000 -0.0914 -0.1350 0.1523
 TR - - 1.0000 0.2934 -0.0625
 TE 1.0000 -0.6576
 TBR .... 1.0000
 TABLE 7 EMPIRICAL RESULTS (ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL) FOR
 EQUATION (6) FOR THE TOP FIFTEEN PROVINCES OF THE SAMPLE
 Independent Variable
 lnpy 0.1309 (0.0054)**
 FAI 0.9107 (0.0151)**
 RA -5.0970 (0.0899)**
 RB -7.1089 (0.0861)**
 EA 12.0628 (0.1066)**
 EB -6.7550 (0.1743)**
 EBR -0.7955 (0.0504)**
 RootMSE 17.3139
 Breusch-Pagan Test Q 0Q75
 Lagrange Multiplier Statistic
 Notes: **Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; *indicates significance at the 5 per cent
 level; values in parentheses are standard deviations.
 This is statistically meaningful with a significance level of 1 per cent, i.e., it
 does not support the conditional convergence Hypothesis, whilst the development
 inclination of those provinces and regions that rank higher in overall strength is
 divergent. The estimated coefficient of the ratio of fixed assets to national income
 (FAI) is positive with a significance level of 1 per cent, which supports the
 expectations of the theoretical model. As in Table 1, the estimated coefficients of TR
 and EBR are both negative with a significance level of 1 per cent; what is different
 from those in Table 1 is that the estimated coefficient of TE is positive with a
 significance level of 1 per cent. Since the overall strength indicators include
 economic performance, provinces having superior overall strength also perform
 better economically; therefore, expenditure is favorable to economic growth.
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 TABLE 8 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDEPENDENT
 VARIABLES FOR EQUATION (6) FOR THE TOP FIFTEEN
 PROVINCES OF THE SAMPLE
 py FAI RA RB EA EB EBR
 py 1.0000 0.0426 0.0409 -0.1641 0.1825 -0.1615 -0.1015
 FAI - 1.0000 0.1249 -0.0430 0.0516 -0.1185 -0.0514
 RA - - 1.0000 0.6347 -0.3052 0.1427 -0.7544
 RB - - - 1.0000 -0.3002 0.1921 -0.4742
 EA 1.0000 0.0570 -0.1086
 EB ----- 1.0000 -0.3059
 EBR ------ 1.0000
 As in Table 5, analysis of the results in Table 7 show that the estimated
 coefficient of the initial condition (In py) was positive. The estimated coefficient of
 FAI is positive, whilst that of EBR is negative, both with a significance level of 1 per
 cent. With regard to the fiscal revenue sub-category, the estimated coefficients of
 both RA and RB are negative with a significance level of 1 per cent, i.e., if
 expenditure remains unchanged, any increase in revenue is unfavorable to
 employment and investment, as well as to economic growth. As for the case of the
 expenditure sub-category, as in Equation (6), the estimated coefficient of EA is
 positive; this is statistically meaningful with a significance level of 1 per cent, thus
 suggesting that expenditure of EA has something to do with economic growth.
 Economic growth is helped by higher efficiency, which is led by higher overall
 strength. The estimated coefficient of EB is negative with a significance level of 1
 per cent. Since EB is the expenditure arising from price subsidy, an increase in this
 type of expenditure contributes little to economic growth. The empirical results for
 the bottom fifteen provinces ranked by overall strength are listed in Tables 9 to 12.
 As Tables 9 and 1 1 show, the respective Breusch and Pagan LMs are 0.0225 and
 0.075; both are smaller than the chi-square distribution critical value of 6.63 with a
 significance level of 1 per cent and degree of freedom of 1 .
 TABLE 9 EMPIRICAL RESULTS (ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL) FOR
 EQUATION (5) FOR THE BOTTOM FIFTEEN PROVINCES
 OF THE SAMPLE
 Independent Variable
 lnpy -0.1329 (0.1515)
 FAI 0.3436 (0.1259)**
 TR -0.2239 (0.1206)
 TE -0.5713 (0.2307)*
 EBR -0.5197 (0.5279)
 RootMSE 1.3093
 Breusch-Pagan Test Lagrange Multiplier
 Statistic
 Notes: **Indicates significance at the 1 per cent level; * indicates significance at the 5 per cent
 level; values in parentheses are standard deviations.
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 TABLE 10 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDEPENDENT
 VARIABLES FOR EQUATION (5) FOR THE BOTTOM FIFTEEN
 PROVINCES OF THE SAMPLE
 py FAI TR TE EBR
 py 1.000 -0.0598 0.5165 0.3480 -0.2417
 FAI - 1.0000 0.1795 -0.1545 -0.1196
 TR - - 1.0000 0.3983 -0.2233
 TE 1.0000 0.2920
 TBR .... 1.0000
 TABLE llEMPIRICAL RESULTS (ERROR COMPONENTS MODEL) FOR
 EQUATION (6) FOR THE BOTTOM FIFTEEN PROVINCES OF
 THE SAMPLE
 Independent Variable
 lnpy 0.0525 (0.1388)
 FAI 0.3268 (0.1549)*
 RA 0.0104 (0.7770)
 RB -0.3065 (1.1191)
 EA -0.4297 (0.3183)
 EB -1.5431 (2.0488)
 EBR -0.7531 (0.7511)
 RootMSE 1.0898
 Breusch-Pagan Test Lagrange Multiplier
 Statistic
 Notes: * Indicates significance at the 5 per cent level; values in parentheses are standard
 deviations.
 TABLE 12 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF INDEPENDENT
 VARIABLES FOR EQUATION (6) FOR THE BOTTOM FIFTEEN
 PROVINCES OF THE SAMPLE
 py FAI RA RB EA EB EBR
 py 1.0000 -0.2279 0.3715 -0.0521 0.3501 -0.2511 -0.1896
 FAI - 1.0000 0.0965 -0.1167 -0.2881 0.2148 -0.1772
 RA - - 1.0000 -0.1266 0.3458 -0.0506 -0.4530
 RB 1.0000 0.0173 0.0318 0.1734
 EA 1.0000 -0.1620 -0.2028
 EB ----- 1.0000 -0.4143
 EBR ..--.- 1.0000
 The model thus possesses homoskedasticity with no specification error. The
 correlation coefficients in Table 10 are between -0.2417 and 0.5165, whilst those in
 Table 12 are between -0.4530 and 0.3715; therefore, multi-collinearity does not exist
 between the two sets of independent variables.
 As shown in Table 9, the estimated coefficient of FAI is positive with a
 significance level of 1 per cent, whilst the estimated coefficient of TE is negative
 with a significance level of 5 per cent. The signs of TE in Tables 1 and 9 are negative
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 and significant. Since the observed samples in Table 9 are of inferior overall strength,
 they tend to perform worse economically; those bottom provinces had had to depend
 heavily on central government subsidies, again moral hazard was likely, therefore,
 inefficient expenditure is unfavorable to economic growth. Analysis of Table 1 1
 reveals that the estimated coefficient of FAI was positive with a significance level of
 5 per cent; therefore, an increase in fixed assets investment is favorable to economic
 growth.
 CONCLUSIONS
 During the process of institutional transformation, China's fiscal system has
 gone through several stages of evolution and even the fiscal contract system itself
 went through many changes between 1980 and 1993. The empirical results for the
 whole sample show an inclination towards convergence of regional economic
 growth, thus supporting the conditional convergence hypothesis. In addition, an
 increase in regional tax revenue hinders investment and employment due to excessive
 taxation, which is unfavorable to economic growth. The same finding applies to
 extra-budgetary revenue. The fiscal contract system required provinces to balance
 their budgets, and if revenue remained unchanged, then increased expenditure had to
 be subsidized by the central government. Since the local governments did not have to
 pay back the subsidy, inefficient funds utilization was likely and there was thus little
 contribution to economic growth.
 Ranked by their overall strength, the provinces were divided into economically
 advanced and backward groups for empirical testing. Comparison of the empirical
 results with the sample of the top and bottom fifteen provinces, in terms of their
 overall strength, demonstrated that the economic growth of the top fifteen provinces
 tended to be divergent. More fiscal revenue and extra-budgetary funds are
 unfavorable to economic growth; the results are the same for all provinces, and they
 remain the same when fiscal revenue is itemized. The difference between the two lies
 in fiscal expenditure. The economic growth of those provinces with superior overall
 strength gains from fiscal expenditure because of their superior efficiency
 performance, whilst the opposite is true for those with inferior overall strength.
 The empirical findings also have some important implications for China's
 transitional economy and other developing economies. The transformed government
 system (both central and local) has to assume functions corresponding to the market
 mechanism, or face the grave consequences of government failure. The issues of
 defining central and local government rights and responsibilities, improving rule of
 law, solidifying local democracy and elevating government efficiency are challenges
 which a reform-minded government has to tackle immediately.
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 ENDNOTES
 'For a discussion on the tax assignment system, see Herscher (1995), Ma (1995), Hu (1998),
 Zhao and Zhang (1999) and Lee (2000).
 2Guangdong and Fujian provinces adopted 'separating revenue and expenditure; submitting a
 fixed amount; or being subsidized a fixed amount'. Guangdong submitted Renminbi (RMB) 1
 billion while Fujian was subsidized RMB 150 million annually.
 3Total amount sharing' relied heavily on tax items to distinguish between different fiscal
 revenues.
 4Categorization of fiscal revenue and expenditure has to take into account multicollinearity.
 Fiscal revenue comprises of various types of taxes, enterprise income, and others, whilst fiscal
 expenditure comprises of economic construction, culture and education, administration and
 price subsidies. Based on this categorization, multicollinearity exists between the independent
 variables; therefore, our empirical analysis does not use this type of categorization.
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